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ABSTRACT 
A pl1otograpllic project a11d cxcgcsi~ dcmo11strati11g artificial illtclligenct• a11d artificial life as 
OCCIIfrCIICC~ of the abject. 
In the photographic project '0•2', the technologies of artificial intelligence and 
artificial life are examined in relation to identity, via an elaboration of the 
psychoanalytic concert of the 'abject' . 
An exegesis of the creative project contains an investigation of computer technologies 
in regard to identity, an analysis of the basic concepts and paradigms of tht' sciences 
of artificial intelligence and artificial life, and an elaboration of the psychoanalytic 
concept of the abject - dt'monstrating A.l. and a-life as cultural instantiations of 
abjcction. In addition, an examination of tt:~ creative work provides a further 
amplification of these analyses. 
Both the creative work and the companion exegesis will contribute to cybercultural 
theory and arts practice, providing a psychoanalytic understanding of these scientific 
technologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence (A.I.) is a nominal term for technological development whose 
teleological goal seems to be the birth of a new specit:'s that mirrors or exceeds human 
intelligence and consciousness. Similarly. artificial life (a-life) research simulates living 
organisms, attempting the actual ' in silico' creation of life itself (Levy, 1992). 
Technological devclopm<'nts that advance these mimetic goals concur with new 
undcrstandings of human intelligence, consciousness and biology. 
Artificial intelligence and artificia l life involve both current technological application 
and futuristic speculation. While the objl>cts of scientific research and market 
development, they arc also the objects of o ur cultural imagination. Representations of 
A.l. and a-life exist in art (the visu.1l art of Patricia Piccinini and M:~riko Mori), film 
(Tire Terminator, RoboCop. Blade P.unnt•r, 171£' Matrix. A./., and i Rolrvt), and literature 
(Margie Piercy's Ht•, 5/u•, and 11, Richard Power's Ga/atea, and Mary Shelley's 
Franken~tcin). These representations exemplify and explore understandings of human 
identity in relation to this technology. 
The photographic project 0 = 2 is a cybcrcultural arts practice, dr<Hving on 
philosophical illuminations of science and technology in order to cxplor<' th<' 
imagin<'d identities of th<'se clrtificial creations. \'\1hile many artists and theorists have 
explort'd subjectivity in relation to the notion of the cyborg (where the bin,uy between 
human and machine has been collapsed), this creative work and its companion 
exegesis explore the spt>cificities of identity in relation to a machine imagined as an 
autonomous other. Julia Kristeva's concept of a/Jjt~ctitm, as a repetition of patterns of 
identification and separation, is a relevant model for understanding and revealing 
unconscious processes at work in the construction of this artificial 'other'. Through 
the use of the psychoanalytic concept of the abject, this project attempts to determine 
the nature of these technologi<'S in relation to idcntitf . 
The project's significance, for both theory and photography, is its unique treatment of 
the scientific concepts of A.l. and a-life in terms of the psychoanalytic concef l :1f 
abjection. Both the creative work and exegesis add to both cultural analyses of A.l. 
1md a-life, and contemporary photographic responses to these new technologi<'S. 
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The aims of the creative project and its exegesis arc: the identification and review of 
cybercultural analyses of the constructions of identity within computer technologies; 
the identification and review of the paradigms of the sciences of A.l. and a-l ife; an 
elaboration of Julia Kristcva's psychoanalytic concept of abjection. demonstrating the 
occurrence of the abject within A.l. and a-life; and a photographk response to these 
investigations. 
The creative proj<.>ct 0 • 2 is a photographic and textual narrative of a n imagined 
A.l./a-life identity. The project comprises a collection of 82 photographs using both 
traditional and digital photographic technologies. The narratiw of 0 = 2 is an 
exemplification of abjection in relation to the technologies of art ificial intelligence and 
art ificial life. 
In this exegesis, the concepts of A.l. and a-life arc identified and examined via an 
elaboration of the psychoanalytic concept of the a bject. Within Chapter 1, Identity and 
Tcdm11fogy, cyberculture analyses of computer technologies arc identified .tnd 
reviewed in r<•lation to conscious and unconscious undcrstandings of the body, mind, 
and life. Chapter 2, 171t' Artificial Otll!•r, id<.'ntifics and reviews thl' forms, concepts and 
paradigms of the sciences of A.l. and a-life. Chapter 3, All Abject r,•cfmology. both 
elaborates Kristeva's conrept of abjcction as a repeated pattern of separation and 
identification, and demonstrates A.l . and a-life as cultural occurrences of this pattern. 
Chapter 4, 0 • 2. 171£' Mirror and till' Knife. provides a theoretical explanation of the 
creative work in regard to this .malysis. 
An analysis of the paradigms of A.l. and a-life by a rl'scarcher outside of these 
disciplines could be considered a limitation of this project. Accordingly, this research 
rcvi€.'ws commentary from both ir.side and outside these fields, outlining the general 
concepts and pa radigms of the science. However, this review reveals a range of 
commentaries from other disciplines, with varying levels of impact on A.l. and a-life 
research. Additionally, a cultura l analysis of scientific disciplines - as manifestations 
of the cultural - seems both relevant and appropriate to this project. 
Creative research for this project includes a small contribution to performance artist 
Stelarc's Prm;tlu:tic Head project in the form of programming and content creation. The 
Prosfll(•tic Head is an 'embodied conversational agent' using artificial intelligence 
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natura l language programming. This contribution provides practical experience of 
one part icular model of A.J. research. Similarly, experience of utilizing the paradigms 
of A.l. and a-life within art is gained via collaboration in an A.l.fa-life electronic 
music p iece, perfor1:1ed in 2004 at WAAPA and the Artrn~c festival Conh•src. These 
creative rl'SCan:h experiences both provide practical experience of A.J. and a-life 
technologies, and contribute to the photographic and textual construction o f an 
artificial identity within the creative project. 
0 • 2, as a photographic elaboration of abjcction, demonstrates the sciences of A.l. and 
a-life as repetit ions of abject patterns of separation and identification. Kristeva is a 
theorist Hprimarily interested in bringing the psychic to bear on the social. and in 
exploring how the unconscious articulates itself in cultureH (Caputi, 1993, p. 38). The 
abject is a pcrtin"nt concept for an analysis of the unconscious processes at work in 
the construction of these technologies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
IDENTITY & TECHNOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The technologies of A.l. and a-life arise from, and contribute to, cultural 
understandings of identity. Cyberculture, as a multiplicity of theoretical and artistic 
practices, exists at the intersection of science, technology and culture. Cyberculture 
theory and art have embraced and critiqued discourses of science and technology for 
both their liberatory and oppressive potential. Similarly, psychoanalytic theory has 
understood the technologies of science as exemplifications of unconscious desires and 
impulses. A.l. and a-life arc understood and researched according to both conscious 
and unconscious understandings of the body, the brain, consciousness, matter, 
sentience, and life. 
IDENTITY AND TECHNOLOGY 
Recent critiques of science have shown that the assumptions of objectivity and the 
actual firctrialncss of scienco.Y arc embedded within the very cultural prejudices of 
gender, race, class and sexuality. Evelyn rox Keller's studies on gender and science 
reveal "gender and gender norms (as the) silent organiscr ... of the natural sciences" 
(Wcrtheim, 1997, p. 77). Similarly, technologies, as artefacts of the scientific enterprise, 
arc neither neutral nor culture free. Nina Lykke (1996) asserts that from its beginnings 
the project of science has been to tame and domesticate nature into artefacts that 
represent "a happy future where humans are in total control of nature" (p. D). 
Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (1991b) critique technology as fully implicit in 
the power relations of late capitalism in its "policing of bodies" and "rationalization 
of nature" (p. xii). Donna Haraway's oft cited "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, 
Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century" (1985) 
popularised the constructionist notion of science and technology as culture. Haraway's 
analysis includes a description of the construction of human bodies via the historical 
and ideological construction of both nature and biology. She asserts that biology is 
not comprised of the actual objects of its study, but is instead a discourse vital to the 
creation of 'raced' and 'sexed' bodies. For example, the human genome project claims 
the body as a text of code, rcsu~ting in practices affecting reproduction and the actual 
likelihood of life for bodies, that do or do not count as bodies in our culture (Penley & 
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Ross, 1991a). The concern of science with the truths of nature and matter is the 
antecedent for the construction of artificial intelligence and artificial life. 
The notion of the body, the mind, and of nature itself, as 'machinic' (or machine like) 
is a seduc~ive and compelling paradigm. A.l. and a-life embody notions of 
humankind as godlike in our ability to create a new species 'in our o·.vn image' . Yet if 
we succeed in duplicating our distinct capabilities, these technologies could, of 
necessity, supersede these capabilities to the extent of human irrelevance (c.f. Joy, 
2000; Kurzweil, 1999; Moravec, 1998). Additionally, A.l. and a-life seem to be both a 
copying, and a rejection, of 'the body' and ' nature'. These technologies exemplify a 
contradictory complexity that is a challenge to understand and to record. 
Constructions of the body and the mind are central to the research undertaken in A.l. 
and a-life, while conversely, scientific understandings of the body's relationship to the 
mind give rise to cultural theories of identity and subjectivity. 
Scientists and commentators speculate futures based on the scientific advances of A. I. 
and a-life. Roboticist Hans Moravec (1998) predicts the future downloading of minds 
into computers in order to keep pace with the evolution of A.l. robots - "biological 
humans can either adopt the fabulous mechanisms of robots, thus becoming robots 
themselves, or then can retire into obscurity" (p. 283), ceding to the superiority of this 
new species. Similarly, Kevin Kelly (1995) predicts an emergence-based 'neo-
biological' future, where a cyborg-like merging of biology and technology extends to 
the entire environment. Performance artist Stelarc (1995) insists the merging of the 
body and technology announces the end of human evolution, resulting in the 'trans-
human' or 'extraterrestrial' subject. 
David Tomas (1995) considers the cultural influences of A.l. research. For example, in 
an analysis of representations of the body and the machine, he relates how Norbert 
Wiener's cybernetics gave rise to new understandings of the body. Based on the ideas 
of computer scientist Norbert Wiener, cybernetics views the body and the computer 
as 'networks' acting upon each other in a continual process of 'feedback'. The body 
and the machine were understood as " two functionally equivalent states or stages of 
cybernetic organization" (Tomas, 1995, p. 25). Tomas recognises the relevance of this 
paradigm beyond the field of cybernetics, asserting a cross discipline influence on the 
representation of the human. 
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For example, Tomas argues that the idea of 'feedback' impacted on communications 
theorist Marshall Mcluhan's 1964 idea of technology liS a l10dily p1 ;thesis by 
proposing an interactive relationship between the body and technology. Tomas traces 
cybernetic notions of the body in relation to virtual reality (VR), where the body is 
"reimaged and reimagined to be an inconsequential historical residue, a kind of 
chimera, or puppet" (p. 38). He claims that the notion 'the human as information' is 
employed as a means of adapt<'tion to an environment composed ~ntirely of 
information (Tomas, 1995). 
Sherry Turkle's (1995) research claims the introduction of the Internet as a factor for 
changing views on community, sexuality and identity. For Turkle, our changing 
identity is part of the postmodern context, where the self is no longer individual, and 
the dualities of the real and the virtual are disturbed. She uses the example of Multi-
User Domains (MUDS) and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) as down-to-earth user 
experiences of the postmodern abstractions of 'fluid' and 'multiple' identities (Turkle, 
1995). 
While it is interaction with computer technology that elaborates these postmodern 
identities, she also identifies a more 'modernist' construction of the computer. The 
logical and linear nature of computers exemplifies the modernist project of perceiving 
and understanding the world through its constituent parts. However, for Turkle, we 
have made a cultural shift from the "modernist culture of calculation toward a 
postmodernist culture of simulation" (p. 20). This shift is exemplified in the change 
from the modernist approach of A.l. to a-life's more "postmodern aesthetic of 
complexity and decentering" (p. 20). 
The relationship of the computer to the self is related by Turkle in a mimetic tangle 
where the brain is understood as a computer, the computer is likened to a brain, 
computer science uses biology to model intelligence and life, and biology conceives of 
the body as code. 
Claudia Springer (1996) and Sadie Plant (1995; 1996a; 1997) recognize and celebrate 
the relationship between the computer and postmodern identity. For Springer, 
technologies such as A.l. invoke a Cartesian privileging of the rational mind over the 
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body. She cites Marvin Minsky's notion of the brain as a "meat machine" (p. 39), 
where consciousness is an effect of machinic processes, and Hans Moravec's 'post-
biological future' as notions that foreshadow human extinction. However, the cyborg 
merging of human and machine makes the Cartesian dualism irrelevant. In 
postmodernism where the dualisms have collapsed, the human lives on as the 
'posthuman' (Springer, 1996). 
Sadie Plant (1996a) utilizes the notion of human and machine as a cybernetic system. 
For Plant, neural nets and parallel processing are related to the decentered and 
multiple self. Plant asserts that man's desire to free himself from the body is an 
extension of the attempt to control nature (Plant, 1996a). Women and software, used 
by men as the tools and resources of this attempt, 'self-organize' and 'self-arouse' 
within the system (Plant, 1995). Transcendence from the body is an illusion, and man 
remains part of the system he is trying to control. Women, at home with the network 
and matrix, interact with .:he machine in a liberatory ' fluid' identity (Van Gelder, 
1997). For women, "there is a virtual reality, an emergent process for which identity is 
not the goal but the enemy" (Luckman, 1999, p. 39). 
Sandy Stone (cited in Dyson, 1997) relates how her research into ' phone sex' 
convinced her it was not information but 'bodies' being transmitted electronically 
over the telephone. <;tone argues that technology makes us rethink our bodies. In the 
virtual world of the computer, subjectivity and the body are separate, leading to a 
new understanding of embodiment. For Stone (1992), virtuality is associated with the 
feminine - in cyberspace "penetration translates into envelopment.. .to enter 
cyberspace ... is to put on the female" (p. 109). In cyberspace we are able to abandon the 
unified self, and 'multiple' and 'liquid' identities and genders result. However, Stone 
explicitly warns that these identities are still very much 'grounded' in bodies that "we 
forget.. .at our peril" (p. 108). 
For Alison Adam (1998b), elimination of the body is based on the assumption that 
replication of a mind produces a person. Adam also criticizes A.l. and a-life research as 
not properly explicating the workings of knowledge, particularly the knowledge of 
women. She believes artificial intelligence is unlikely to occur, relegating it to the 
realm of science fiction. Similarly, she sees the a-life concept of emergence, where 
unanticipated behaviours emerge from the complex interaction of systems, as 
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'mystical' - concurring with Daniel Denuett's (cited in Kirkup, Janes, Woodward, & 
Hovenden, 2000) description of "Woo-Woo West Coast Emergence" 1 that is 
"unsubstantiated .. . (and a) convenient level of description" (p. 252). Similarly, Herbert 
Klein (2000) dismisses the A.l understanding of the mind and body as a "facile elision 
of differences" (p. 6) where cognition is reduced to formalism. 
Examining Hans Moravec's vision, N. Katherine Hayles (1999) asks how information 
became separated from the body. She draws a comparison between Moravec's notion 
of the human ability to place consciousness into a machine, and the 'liberal subject' 
that denies the biological body in representation. For Hayles, notions of the 
'posthuman' rely on the privileging of consciousness in Western thought, whereas it 
remains only part of evolution - "an epiphenomenon .. . trying to claim that it h; the 
whole show" (p. 3). She claims the separation of information from matter produces 
the notion of the body as prosthesis. Thus, Moravec's downloading of the brain is 
really just an extension of that process - a way of seeing the body as separate and 
inessential (Hayles, 1999). The liberal subject, criticised by feminists and post-
colonialists for the privileging of a particular gender and race, also privileged the 
rational mind - which only "possessed a body" (p. 4). ·rhe posthuman, that favours 
the multiplicity of identity, is similar to the liberal subject, in that they both view 
embodiment as inessential. However, she insists, information works through, and is 
situated in, a medium such as the body (Hayles, 1999). 
Anne Balsamo (1999) claims that virtual technologies offer a means of transcendence 
from race and gender identities. However, transcendence is based on the notion of 
language as a neutral, culture free system of signification. For Balsamo, the 
postmodern digital body is still inscribed within cultural systems, with transcendence 
"signal(ling) a desire to return to the 'neutrality' of the body, to be rid of the culturally 
marked body" (p. 287). 
Zoe Sofia (1993), in h~r analysis of gender in r~?lation to computer culture, makes a 
strong claim for the relevance of a psychoanalytic analysis of technology. 
Psychoanalysis, as a study of the latencies of the unconscious, reveals and names the 
1 Dennet reports 'Woo-Woo' as a term used to disparage 'New Age' philosophies commonly 
associated with California in the 80s and 90s. 
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desires concealed and unnamed in the ' rational' construction of technologies such as 
A. I. and a-life. 
Sofia (1993) reports Freud's description of his nephew's 'fort/ da' game (a repetitive 
discarding and retrieval of a cotton reel) as related to the child's separation from the 
mother. The child's play represents a resultant "desire for mastery" (p. 24) 
understood as synonymous with the cultural desire for mastery "through knowledge 
and manipulation of objects" (p. 24) . 
Similarly, both Freud and Melanic Klein situate the primal scene, where a child views 
his/her parents in the sexual act, as the unconscious drive behind the search for 
knowledge. In this psychoanalytic scenario the search returns always to the origin 
point- the mother's body (Sofia, 1993). 
Freud understood art, religion, philosophy (and here Sofia adds ' technology'), as 
culturally legitimized neurotic impulses. Sofia (1993) argues that it is "maternal 
reproductive power ... that is initially denied, subsequently mimicked, and then 
elaborated" in technology (p. 48). The child's throwing away and retrieval of the toy 
are related to sadistic and healing impulses where the desire for knowledge is seen as 
either a probing of, or a substitution for, the mother's body. She argues that 
technological constructions (such as A.l.) that compare the computer to the human 
mind then become a fantasy of masculine reproductive ability and a denial of human 
reproductive sexual difference (Sofia, 1993). 
Barbara Creed's (1987a) psychoanalytic analysis of the film Alien again invokes the 
maternal as the site of sexual difference. Creed (drawing on Julia Kristeva's notion of 
the abject) theorizes the mother as a monstrous figure of abjection within the horror 
genre. The mother, as "origin of all life threaten(s) to reabsorb what it once birthed" 
(pp 129 - 130). The maternal, as the lack of separation between subject and object, is 
repressed in order to limit the disruption of the symbolic. Maternal excess is 
controlled in the horror film via a disruption of the cinematic gaze, in the looking, and 
refusal to look, of the spectator. Creed (1987a) posits the horror genre as a constant 
confrontation with, and denial of, the maternal. Similarly, Mary Ann Doane (1990) 
describes representations of technology, in the horror and science fiction genres, as 
functioning to control the 'excesses of the maternal'. She understands motherhood as 
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the limit of the mechanical, citing Huyssen's analysis of Metropolis where "the 
ultimate technological fantasy ... is creation without the mother" (p. 114). 
An analysis of films such as Alien and Blade R11nner reveals primal scene concerns 
with origin and history . These concerns are related to a crisis in reproduction due to 
the reproductive power of new technologies. New technologies attempt to 
'debiologise' the maternal, resulting in the disruption of the stability of the categories 
of the maternal and paternal - with an ensuing crisis in subjectivity that is based on 
these very categories (Doane, 1990). In an analysis of Alicc Jardine's concept of 
'gynt>sis' in sci-fi horror films, Barbara Creed (1987b) asserts that women's bodies 
signify the monstrous. Creed relates Jean-Francois Lyotard's claim that reproductive 
technologies threaten the first home of the su'bject - the mother's body. These 
technologies therefore place the unconscious relations of the subject and the body in 
crisis. 
In an analysis of the artistic representations of the cyborg, Bruce Grenville (2001) sees 
the cyborg figure as an expression of our cultural anxiety about technology. Grenville 
argues that automata are the opportunity both to mimic the human, and to perceive 
our difference from the machine. Freud's notion of the 'uncanny' (as the familiar, that 
once repressed, returns as the uncanny) is ih.voked by Grenville in the form of the 
machine that is so familiar " it threatens to consume us" (p. 21). Grenville understands 
notions of the body as ' meat' or 'wetwarc' in relation to the mind machines of A. I. and 
virtual reality, as a reworking of the Cartesian mind/body split. He claims that these 
notions work to shift our anxiety about engulfment by the machine, through the 
possibility of transcendence (Grenville, 2001). 
In each. of these analyses, technology functions to either control the monstrousness of 
the maternal, or replace its reproductive abilities. Additionally, in Grenville's 
analysis, the monstrous maternal is not controlled, but reasserted by the reproductive 
abilities of technology. 
The monstrous also surfaces in relation to the 'copy'i .or 'double', birthed apart from 
the maternal, in Marie-Helene Huet's (1993) research into representations of monsters. 
The monster is also invoked as a variant of Haraway's machine/human 'cyborg' 
figure (c.f. Badley, 1995; Braidotti, 19%; Haraway, 1997; Lykke, 19%). The monster is 
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seen as a representation nf the blurring of boundaries that, while evoking fear and 
loathing, remains a site for actions of liberation such as feminism. While both the 
monster and the cyborg, as border creatures, create fertile domains for understanding 
the relationship of technology to subjectivity, they are categories that serve to 
represent only the disruption of the human/machine binary. An analysis of A.l. and 
a-life in respect to the abject is an attempt to understand both the disruption and 
reinforcement of that very boundary. 
CONCLUSION 
A.l. and a-life are fields of scientific research attempting to map intelligence and 
sentience. The teleology of these fields is the construction of a technological 'other' . 
A.l. and a-life research and development, like that of other sciences, advances 
distinctly cultural understandings of the body, mind, and identity. Cyberculture 
theorists, such as Kelly (1995), Stelarc (1995), Springer (1996) and Plant (1995; 1996a; 
1997), have celebrated the cultural technologiP.s of A.l. and a-life as postmodern, in 
that they liberate the subject from oppressive, unitary identity. For these theorists, 
technology is the means by which the posthuman self adapts to the postmodern 
world, with the self becoming fluid, multiple, female, and decentred. However, 
cyberculture theorists, such as Hayles (1999), Balsamo (1999) and Adam (1998b), have 
also critiqued these technologies as mystical, reductionist, and modernist 
understandings of consciousness, where a privileging of mind over body reinscribes 
an oppressive identity. 
Through a psychoi\nalytic analysis, A. I. and a-life can be seen to intersect with desires 
for control and transcendence. The mother's body is investigated and regulated by the 
search for knowledge. Similarly, the construction of technology is part of a constant 
process of confrontation with and rejection of the maternal body. Technology controls 
or replaces the monstrousness of the maternal in an attempt to stabilise identity. The 
monster and the cyborg, as boundary creatures, utilize the monstrousness of the 
maternal as a useful site for disruption of oppressive cultural identities. However, A. I. 
and a-life can be seen as unconscious attempts to reinforce identity - an identity 
perpetually 'in crisis' and ' in process'. A.l. and a-life, as attempts to create a 
technological other, can be seen as an abjection of the maternal and the 'culturally 
marked' body. Kristeva's notion of the abject is a relevant and useful tool for an 
analysis of these scientific constructions. 
IS 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ARTIFICIAL OTHER 
INTRODUCTION 
The field of Artificial Intelligence is based on the notion that the brain, as a natural 
phenomenon, is able to be modelled. Artificial simulations of the brain have 
impressively solved mathematical theorems, defeated the world chess champion, and 
even simulated a psychiatric therapist. The computational capacity of computers 
exceeds that of human subjects, yet the intractable problems for the field arise from 
attempting skills "that any five-year-old possesses: telling the difference between a 
dog and a cat, or understanding an animated cartoon" (Kurzweil, 1999, p. 88). 
Recognition that intelligence exceeds computational ability led to the creation of 
neural networks modelled on the neurons of the brain. These networks, taught via the 
feedback of reward and punishment, identified and utilized pattern recognition as the 
essential factor of intelligence. Other forms of A.l. include 'evolutionary algorithms' 
(such as those largely r~nning the stock market) that take feedback from the 
environment to make new, more proficient programs. Further areas of research 
include computing with light, utilizing the enzyme reactions of DNA to complete 
arithmetic and logical operations, quantum computing, and the atomic level robots of 
nanotechnology (Kurzweil, 1999). 
While the field of A.l. has had many practical applications, artificial intelligence has 
never actually been proclaimed, as "the whole point of models is that they contain 
only certain features of the modelled domain and leave out the rest" (Scarle, 1990, p. 
31). In other words, the ground keeps shifting, and "simulation is not the same as 
duplication" (p. 31). 
Similarly, artificial life research is based on an understanding of life itself as 
information. Biology is understood to be mathematical and logical, and therefore 
capable of simulation. A-life representations take the form of complex self-organizing 
systems that theoretically could evolve to the level of complexity of a human. Unlike 
the 'top down' approach of A.l. where solution-oriented structures are imposed on 
the system, a-life is a 'bottom up' model where simple rules are believed to lead to 
greater complexity. 'Automata', or 'self-operating' machines, programmed with 
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simple rules interact with each other and encounter programmed environmental 
factors, in a simulation of evolutionary processes. They live, die, reproduce, grow, 
self-repair, and adapt. Automata who exhibit behaviour that was not programmed to 
occur are showing evidence of 'emergence'. The notion of emergence is the key to a 
theory that secs life itself as a characteristic of the complex organization of matter 
(Levy, 1992). 
As in artificial intelligence research, advances in the field occur through attempts to 
understand real life biological processes. A description of a real life process could lead 
to a simulation, which in turn could lead to a new understanding of the natural 
worl. In both research fields a distinction is drawn between 'weak' and 'strong' 
theoretical positions, with the former understanding the research as illuminative, 
while the later prophesises definitive results- such as the replication of mind and life. 
The crux of both fields of research seems to be the distinction between the known and 
the not known of the body and of biology. 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
The term artificial intelligence was coined by John McCarthy for a 1956 Dartmouth 
College conference. However, A.l.'s beginnings arc customarily located in the late 
1940's invention of the digital computer and the ensuing publication of Alan Turing's 
paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (Devlin, 1997; Selkirk, 1986). Turing's 
paper effectively described the means by which digital computers might replicate 
intelligence. For Turing, digital computers were discrete state maclrines that calculat<'d 
by means of movement from one discrete state to another (i.e. O's and l's). As a result 
of this method of calculation, a single computer was capable of carrying out any 
appropriately designed calculation or program, and was thus regarded as the 
equivalent of all computers. Digital computers were consequently considered 
rmillersal maclrines (Turing, 1950). The Church-Turing Hypothesis, that "any effective 
procedure can be implemented via a Turing (universal) machine" (Franklin, 1999, p. 
79), concrctised the means by which intelligence, if formalised, could be replicated. 
The first noteworthy A.l. program, developed in response to Turing's paper, was 
Newell, Simon, and Shaw's 'Logic Theorist', which used propositional logic and 
lreuristic rules (rules of thumb) to prove mathematical theorems. Newell and Simon's 
'General Problem Solver' (G.P.S.) followed, with an attempt to solve general logic 
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puzzles from "think aloud protocols" (Adam, 1998a, p. 37). Intelligence was 
considered formal. logical, and able to be organized according to discoverable rules. 
As with the 'Logic Theorist', heuristics were used to organize the complexity of the 
real world into the simplified data required for problem solving (Minsky, 1998). For 
Adam (1998a), these programs operated within a 'bounded rationality' that is 
symptomatic of this early research paradigm of Symbolist or Good Old Fnsl1ioned A./. 
(G.O.F.A.I.). Programs utilized discrete, and therefore simplified, rules-based data 
suitable for computation. The basis of the Symbolist paradigm is the representation of 
knowledge by means of symbols - which arc then manipulated by various processes 
of reasoning and logic (Dcvlin, 1997). 
The clumsiness and slowness of these early programs led to attempts to replicate 
intelligence via pattern recognition. Minsky's frames and Schank and Abelson's scripts 
were programs designed for analogous reasoning via the use of stereotypical 
situations (for instance, one script attempted to describe illl possible situations and 
objects encountered inside a restaurant) (Adam, 1998a). Winston's 'Toy Blocks 
World', where robot arms manipulated toy blocks is an example of the microworlds 
created to model intelligent behaviour within exceptionally simple environments. 
Similarly, expert systems modelled the knowledge of experts within a given specialty 
such as medicine or law (Adam, 1998a). Successes attributed to these domain specific 
programs afforded hope of either a scaling-up, or joining together, of programs in 
order to provide a real-world model. 
These early Symbolist models were critiqucd as simplistic and rcductionist 
understandings of intelligence. The use of heuristics was seen as an inadequate 
attempt to describe and simplify complex processes that arc not always available to 
conscious awareness (Devlin, 1997). Scripts and frames were understood as 
retrospective undcrstandings of responsiveness to unique and specific situations, 
accordingly, these programs entrenched normative and stereotypical undcrstandings 
of the world (Adam, 1998a; Collins, 1995). Similarly, according to Dcvlin, domain 
experts were seen to rely more on intuitive and situational knowledge than formal 
rules. The initial success of microworlds was viewed as unrealistic as it did not 
subsequently lead to application within more complex environments- thus Yehoshua 
Bar-Hillel (cited in Devlin, 1997) termed the scaling-up scenario a "fallacy of the 
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successful first step" (p. 165). Each of these criticisms of A.l. affirmed a recognition of 
the real world as infinitely too complex to formalise within symbols. 
Symbolist A.l. is also critiqued as a refusal of embodiment. For Wilson {2002), Turing, 
both within his paper and an ensuing report, established the subsequent 
disembodiment of A.l. paradigms. Turing (cited in Wilson, 2002) "propose[d) to try 
and see what can be done with a 'brain' which is more or less without a body" (p. 48). 
Adam (1998a) and Devlin (1997) compare Symbolist A.l.'s disembodied 'knowing 
that', or propositional knowledge, with the embodied 'knowing how' of more skills-
based knowledge. Dreyfus (1992) elaborates this distinction with simple-formal, 
complex-formal and 11011formal categories of knowledge. Simple-formal knowledge is 
rule based and context free, and can therefore be successfully programmed within 
A.l. systems. Complex-formal knowledge refers to situation-dependent knowledge -
programmable in reference to limited environments, but requiring infinite heuristics 
to account for more complex situations. Nonformal knowledge is situation-specific, 
exists without definitive rules, and is currently unprogrammable. The impossibility of 
programming nonformal knowledge is clearly evidenced in attempts to model natural 
languages. For Dreyfus, machine translation of natural language is impossible beyond 
'generic and typical' elements - meaning in language is essentially context-dependent 
and "being-in-a-situation turns out to be unprogrammable in principle using 
presently conceivable techniques" (p. 303). Adam (1998a) concurs, arguing that while 
propositional knowledge can be replicated in A.l., 'knowing how' skills knowledge 
requires the presence of a body, she contends that Symbolist A.l. is reductive- in that 
it subsumes this situational 'knowing how' knowledge via the elevation of 
propositional knowledge. 
Adam (1998a) identifies two forms of situational knowledge ignored by Symbolist 
A.l.'s elevation of propositional knowledge: the embodied, and the social. Embodied 
situatedness relates to the physicality of being human. An example is Searle's (1980) 
claim of the exclusively human quality of intentionality - whereby meaning and 
understanding are related to desires, beliefs and intentions. For Searle, intentionality 
is a mental state resulting from biological processes of the brain that cannot be 
replicated by a machine (Searle, 1980; c.f. 'Chinese Room' argument Searle, 1990). 
Social situatedness refers to the non-universal status of knowledge, i.e. knowledge is 
gender, class, culture, and otherwise context based. For Adam the normative status of 
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knowledge is evidenced in Symbolist A.l.'s assumption of a universal subject who is 
male, white, middleclass, and a replica of the typical A.l. researcher. Collins {1995) 
, rgues that the social is the paramount determinant of knowledge and 
because knowledge is socially located, no social isolate, such as a 
computer, can exhibit the full range of human abilities ... the difficult 
question is to explain how computers can exhibit any knowledge at all. 
(p. 298) 
Additionally, he relates how researchers observed A.l. practitioners using complex 
sociological and psychological terminology naively, simplistically, and 'without loss'. 
For Dreyfus {1992), the propositional knowledge of Symbolist A.l. presupposes 
knowledge separated from its physical context. Wilson (2002) claims that this 
separation also includes neglect of the developmental, time-based aspects of 
knowledge. For Collins (1995), limitation and simplification of context result in 
reliable data, serving a scientific paradigm that regards experiment as the provision of 
"unambiguous data that can then be fitted to a theory" (p. 288). However, for 
Dreyfus, Symbolist A.l. transpires as a Jailed experiment that "disconfirm[s) the 
traditional assumption that human reason can be analysed into rule-governed 
operations on situation-free discrete elements" (p. 304). 
Connectionism (or Neural Networks) is the main rival to the Symbolist paradigm. It 
developed alongside Symbolist A.l. from the late 1940s until the 1969 publication of 
Minsky and Paperts Pcrceptrons, a canonical critique of the connectionist model. Re-
emerging in the 1980s, Connectionism offered a simulation of intelligence modelled 
on the actual physicality of the brain's neural networks - with Connectionist 
machines employing large numbers of neuron-like connections, parallel processing, 
and pattern recognition-based learning. Employing a Behaviourist conception of 
learning via reinforced responses to stimuli, the neuron-like connections are weighted 
and adjusted according to 'correct learning' (Adam, 1998a). Connectionism is a 
' bottom-up' model of intelligence with deliberately " unpredictable and 
nondeterministic" {Turkle, 1997, p. 2) results. 
Connectionism's revival in the 1980s was credited to the improvements and 
availability of large parallel computers. Papert (cited in Adam, 1998a) critiques this 
assumption, arguing that the successful models of the 1980s are capable of running on 
small systems like those available in the 1970s. He maintains that Connectionist 
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models research simplistic problems with no substantial evidence of 'scaling-up' to 
more realistically sized networks. For Hoffman (1998), unpredictability generates 
doubt about the reliability of the Connectionist paradigm, including confusion 
regarding what has been learned, and can be learned, by a particular network. He also 
claims neural network systems only resemble brains in terms of large numbers of 
connections and parallel functioning, arguing that while Connectionism therefore has 
attractive functionality for practitioners, it does not credibly duplicate biology. 
Minsky and Papert (1988) concur, arguing in Perceptrons that this model was based on 
the first, little understood, microscopic images of brain structures. For Adam (1998a), 
Connectionist models use the same propositional knowledge of Symbolist systems 
when training connections, with the operator supplying embodied and situated 
knowledge. An operator's decision to strengthen particular connections relies on an 
unconscious subsumption of their situated knowledge within more rule-based 
reasoning. Clocksin (1998) agrees, seeing no substantial improvement on the 
Symbolist model "the computer is still carrying out one abstract task in isolation, free 
of the context of its developmental milieu, defined or parameterised in a way judged 
appropriate by its author" (p. 108). 
ARTIFICIAL LIFE 
Connectionism is often partnered with the emerging discipline of Artificial Life due t.o 
a similitude in bottom-up design and theories of emergence. In the paradigm of 
Artificial Life, the attempted formalisation witnessed within A.l. extends to the 
classificatior. and replication of life itself. The field can be divided into three 
subcategories: wehvnre, lrardwnre and software (Taylor & Jefferson, 1995). Leaving aside 
wetware (which usually refers to artificial processes of building and manipulating 
RNA molecules), both hardware and software categories are modelled within 
computer systems. 
'Hardware artificial life' refers to those models attempting the creation of situated or 
embodied organisms. An example is the 'affect' paradigm whereby ' Kismet', a robot 
head engineered and programmed to physically express emotions, reacts to social 
stimuli via internal 'drive states' . These 'states' basically register differing levels of 
social stimulation and assign an appropriate emotion (Wilson, 2002). Within the same 
laboratory, Rodney Brooks' insect-like robots are lauded as models of situated 
learning and decentralized intelligence. Within a model Brooks calls subs111nption 
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arcllitecture, an insect is programmed with simple behaviours, added one at a time, 
and distributed throughout its 'body' as each new 'competency' of exploration of its 
environment is mastered (Davis, 2002). However, learning does not actually take 
place, as each new skill is hardwired by researchers - Brooks' model imitates 
intelJ.igence without any representations of knowledge (Franklin, 1999). 
'Software artificial life' refers to what is commonly known as a-life- where automata 
live, die, reproduce, and interact with the environment, in simulations designed to 
resemble the actual biological proce~scs of life. The ability of computers to calculate 
data at enormous speeds ideally situates them to simulate evolutionary processes that 
occur naturally over millions of years. Whereas A.l.'s top-down paradigm attempts 
the creation or discovery of the logical rules governing intelligence, a-life is a bottom-
up model, attempting to build the complexity of life from simple underlying 
processes. Life is self-replicating, evolving and autonomous. It is redefined as 
information, and emerges from the complex organization of matter (Kember, 2003). 
Emergence is defined as the occurrence of properties or behaviour not programmed 
into the organism (Hayles, 1996), whilst seco11d order emerge11ce refers to the occurrence 
of behaviours that are catalysts for adaptation within the system (Kember, 2003). 
A-life research was inspired by John von Neumann's 1953 'self-reproducing 
automata'. First developed on a checkerboard, cellular automata. represented by 
black and white checkers, were manipulated in a simulation of biological 
reproduction. Conway's 'Game of Life' developed von Neumann's concept further, in 
a computer simulation utilizing Darwinian concepts of evolution, automata live, die, 
reproduce, and self-repair (Kember, 2003). Further models simulate the flocking of 
birds, the behaviour of insects, and evolutionary arms races (Kember, 2003; Levy, 
1992). The paradigm of a-life has been used for the development of computer games, 
autonomous agents on the Internet, and the regarding of the Internet itself as an 
artificial life form. Similarly, theorists such as Sadie Plant (1996b; 1997) and Kevin 
Kelly (1995) have broadened the concepts of a-life to encompass ll entirety of human 
culture as a connectionist or complex system (Kember, 2003). 
The paradigms of Artificial Life hold a certain appeal within cyberculture - with 
postmodern conceptions of identity as decentred, distributed, constructed over time, 
and situated within the environment. However, this confluence is preceded by what 
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Evelyn Fox Keller (1994) nominates a 'circularity of terms' between post-WW2 
physics, biology and cybernetics. A-life's search for the simple building blocks of 
nature is presaged by the attempt within physics to discover the mathematical basis 
to the universe and by biology's discovery of DNA (Horgan, 1995). For Keller (1994), 
molecular biology's identification of simple building blocks was supplemented with 
the notion of 'linear causality'. Keller argues that this notion, which has become the 
'central dogma' of DNA, was a misappropriation of the cybernetic term 'information' 
- a misuse elidinl:) notions of circularity within its actual technical meaning. Keller 
and Kay (cited in Kember, 2003) claim that there is a "plastic and contingent relation 
between genes, structures and functions" (p. 17) - in other words, despite the 
prevailing narrative of linear causality, DNA does not hardcode a one-way linear flow 
of information. Therefore, Keller asserts, the model ' life = information', reproduced 
within the paradigm of a-life, is simply a reductionist metaphor. Similarly, the terms 
'organism' and 'self-organization' - also arising from the cross-influence between 
cybernetics and microbiology - are claimed as reductive misnomers that conceal a 
complex symbiosis between organisms and environment (Keller, 2002; Umland & 
Wessel, 2002). 
Hayles (1996) identifies a similar elision of meaning in the use of biological language 
within a-life. She demonstrates how the designation of terms such as 'ancestor', 
'mother cell', and 'behaviour' to elements of a computer program, does more than 
confer equivalencies between the·.c .~lcments and biology. Hayles recognizes a-life as 
a tautological narrative whereby the life-like qualities of computer systems are 
justified by the extra meanings these terms gain in a human context. This circularity 
extends to claims that a-life simulations are actual instances of life. For Hayles, this is 
a 'biomorphizing' of a-life systems designed "precisely so they would be able to 
manifest these qualities" (p. 150). 
Hayles reasons that a-life researchers do not analyse the complexity of nature hoping 
to reveal its simple origins, but create the simple parts, justifying their impending 
complexity via the nebulous concept of emergence. Kember (2003) nominates 
emergence as the 'non-vitalists vitalism', claiming it reinscribes what the reductionist 
disciplines of A.l. and a-life eschew - a mystical understanding of life such as the 
vitalist's idea of a hidden force (i.e. chemical or electrical) at the centre of life. If 
emergence is that which surprises the programmer, then Saunders (cited in Kember, 
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2003) insists this surprise relies upon an observer "with a set of expectations" (p. 106). 
Kember considers this 
the paradox of creation that is at the heart of the Alife project: the God-
like act of creating life is 'stolen' or appropriated by man and then 
credited to the computer .... (with) the A life scientist ... an engineer 
masquerading as a scientist, a creationist masquerading as an 
evolutionist, a constructivist masquerading as a naturalist. (pp 55- 591 
CONCLUSION 
The human creation of intelligence and life is attempted though the repeated 
classification and formalisation of mind and sentience within various models of A.I. 
and a-life. The formal rules and pattern-based reasoning of early A.l., whilst 
providing usable data for computation, did not adequately reflect the complexity of 
intelligence. Symbolist A.l.'s assumption of the universality of knowledge failed to 
account for the situational and embodied nature of intelligence. Connectionist A.l. 
promised an improved conception of intelligence modelled on the physicality of the 
brain. However, Connectionist models were critiqued as na·ive, unrealistic models not 
credibly replicating biology. In addition, operator training of Connectionist systems 
appeared to utilize the same propositional knowledge of Symbolist models. In 
Artificial Life research, hardware models of embodied and situated learning were 
critiqued for a similar reliance on operator knowledge. The new paradigm of a-life 
attempted the creation and replication of life itself. However, a-life's tautological use 
of biological terms, along with the somewhat vague and mystical concept of 
emergence, failed to justify these systems as authentic replications of life. Intelligence 
and life remain equally mysterious categories, eluding accurate classification and 
formalisation. 
In his 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence", Alan Turing himself 
claimed a certain mystery in regard to consciousness and "a paradox connected with 
any attempt to localize it" (p. 160). While the nature of computers confirms the 
replication of any formal process, replication is limited to what has been, or is able to 
be, defined. Defined elements of intelligence or sentience have been critiqued for the 
non-inclusion of essential elements, .md are therefore deemed illegitimate definitions. 
Although regarded by researchers as being able to be more accurately defined by 
further research, elPments remaining undefined are considered mystical or vague. 
However, as Kember (2003) reminds us, claims of replication are ultimately not 
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assessable, due to an "always shifting and contested criteria" (p. 59) for intelligence 
and life . It remains unknown if intelligence and life are knowable and therefore able 
to be replicated by these technologies. 
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CHAPTER3 
AN ABJECT TECHNOLOGY 
INTRODUCfiON 
Feminist psychoanalytic theorist Julia Kristeva's (1982) notion of the abject as "the 
subject's reaction to the failure of the subject/object opposition to express adequately 
the subject's corporeality and its tenuous bodily boundaries" (Grosz, 1989, p. 70) is a 
useful concept for the exploration of human subjectivity in relation to the 
technological 'other' of these scientific creations. 
Julia Kristeva, though critical of feminism, is situated alongside the postmodern (or 
French) feminists Luce lrigaray, Michele Le Doeuff, and Helene Cixous. However, 
Kristeva's work, as part of postmodern feminism, has been criticized as too academic. 
Similarly, as part of psychoanalysis, Kristeva has been seen as essentialist in her 
positioning of women. Kelly Oliver (1993) claims that a number of theorists, such as 
Grosz (1986, 1989, 1990) and Silverman (1988), have argued that Kristcva subverts 
essentialism. Similarly, Oliver outlines criticisms of Kristeva as: an 'anarchist'; a 
'conservative'; 'opening avenues for change'; 'closing avenues for change'; 'historical'; 
'ahistorical'; as 'dense' and 'transparent' . Oliver understands these contradictory 
positions as arising from interpretations of the ambiguities in Kristeva's writing 
(Oiiver, 1993b). 
It can be argued that Kristeva is not essentialist, but part of the tradition of 'difference 
feminists' who highlight the constructed (not biological) differences of women as 
powerful sites of liberation. However, it is not the feminist value of Kristeva's theories 
that is the focus of this study. Rather, Kristeva's notion of the abject, as a theory of a 
' subject-in-process', repeatedly reaffirming boundaries by the expulsion and rejection 
of the improper, is a useful model to understand the construction of A.l. and a-life. 
Drawing on an intellectual tradition of existentialism, deconstruction, linguistics, and 
the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan, postmodern feminist theorists 
deconstruct the notion of a unified identity and subjectivity, understanding the self as 
"fundamentally split between its conscious and unconscious dimensions" (Tong, 
1998, p. 196). 
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Jacques Lacan's concepts of the imaginary and the symbolic order are crucial to an 
understanding of the abject. For Lacan, the pre-oedipal infant perceives no distinction 
between itself and the world, chatacterized by belief in 'oneness', or 'sameness', with 
the mother. The child moves from this imaginary via the mirror phase- where the child 
perceives itself 'as a self' through the reilection of the mother's gaze (Tong, 1998). 
During a third phase, the Oedipal crisis, the dyadic unity with the mother is further 
broken by the intervention of the phallus. The child, fearing symbolic castration, 
relinquishes the mother in return for language (Tong, 1998). Therefore, entry into the 
symbolic order is entry into language and culture. 
For Kristeva, the maternal semiotic, not the imaginary, is the precursor to the symbolic. 
The semiotic is the site of mother and child symbiosis, a heterogeneous flow of 
energies that exists prior to identity, form, signification, and hierarchical division 
(such as that between subject and object) (Grosz, 1989; Lechte, 1990). The semiotic is 
both inside (never fully excluded from) and outside the symbolic. The linear, rational .. 
unity of the symbolic is disrupted - by that which is abjectcd by the symbolic. The 
maternal body gives rise to the self as a 'subject- in-process' (Oiiver, 1993b). 
To exist in the symbolic, the subject must have some control over abjection. In this 
psychoanalytic theory, subjectivity is constructed through relationship with, and 
distinction from, the 'other'. The abject signals the impossibility of these very 
categories of self and other (Grosz, 1986), and therefore a self in "perpetual danger" of 
return to the non-identity from which it arose (Kristeva, 1982, p. 9). 
Sexual identity is formed in the attempt to separate from the symbiotic relation to the 
mother's body. While the male child can abject the mother's body via his 
identification with the father, the female child identifies with the mother, and 
therefore has difficulty with this separation (Tong, 1998). For Kristeva, civilization is 
built on the repression of the maternal (Grosz, 1989). Abjection, via the maternal 
body, is associated with both women and those rejected by culture "the Jews, 
Gypsies, homosexuals, deformed, diseased" (Kristeva, 1982, p. 206). 
Abjection is related to repetitive bodily processes of "incorporation, depletion, and 
loss" (Grosz, 1986, p. 109) where objects taken into and expelled from the body are 
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nevertheless never separate from the body. These objects give rise to feelings of 
disgust and fear, and necessitate the forming of social taboos and rituals. There are 
three categories of abjection for Kristeva - food, waste, and sexual difference. The 
category of food involves oral disgust; waste is related to filth and disease; and sexual 
difference is linked to menstruation and maternity (Grosz, 1989). 
Elizabeth Grosz cites the abject as recognition of the body as the basis of 
consciousness, whose unity is gained only via the expulsion of the impure and 
unclean (Grosz, 1986). The abject threatens identity, and all the other seemingly fixed 
categories of culture, yet the abject is also the maternal body expressing itself within 
that cult•· ~e. '< risteva (1982) claims that literature is an "unveiling of the abject" (p. 
208), similarly, A.l. and a-life can be seen as an elaboration of the abject and "the 
horror of beiJ..lg" (p. 208). 
THEABJECf 
Kristeva's theories could perhaps be regarded as a critique of Symbolist A.l. in that 
her entire work negates the Cartesian separation of body and mind by means of her 
remotivation of Freud's theory of the drives. For Kristeva, the drives traverse both 
J body and language, being both biological and cultural "operat(ing) in between these 
two realms and bring[ing) one realm into the other" (Oliver, 1997, p. xvii). Language 
is compric;ed of both the stases of the symbolic and the discharge of drives within the 
semiotic. 
Kristeva also appears to favour the Artifi~ial Life paradigm in her description of 
identity as an 'open system'. She uses the language of a-life to illustrate the psyche's 
response to stimuli as an 'adaptation' bringing forth greater complexity (Lechte, 1990, 
p. 184). Identity is not the Cartesian 'cogito' or transcendental ego- it is not unitary, 
but dynamic, with the semiotic drives operating as a continual articulation ,of the 
body within language (Oliver, 1997). However, the drives are ~nly part of a larger 
pattern of abjection and unification operating between the body and culture. Rather 
than an endorsement of a-life, an application of Kristeva's theory to A.l. and a-life 
reveal both sciences as equivalent instances of abjection. 
Kristeva asserts the existence of patterns in the body prior to the mirror stage and 
signification. A pattern of abjection - as an identity crisis called into being by the non-
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separation of subject and object - arises prior to birth, at birth, and in the sub:.equent 
regulation of the infant's body by the mother. Mother and child do not yet exist as 
distinctly separate entities: "before the umbilical cord is cut, who can decide whether 
there is one or two?" (Oiiver, 1993b, p. 57). Nevertheless, the logic of separation and 
division has begun. From the breast the infant incorporates food that is ' not-yet-
body', and, from the anus, ejects faeces that are 'no-longer-body' (p. 57). The oral and 
anal drives are 'anaclitic' (spin offs), rather than direct translations, of physical needs 
into psychological desires (Moi, 1985)- the mother's regulation of the infant's body, 
by means of rituals related to food and cleanliness, initiates a model for both drives 
and their satisfactions. Similarly, the mother's own body is the original model for the 
excess the drives expel (Lechte, 1990). The anal drive's excess demands rejection, 
bringing both pleasure and loss: 
these drives move through the sphincters and arouse pleasure at the very 
moment substances belonging to the body are separated and rejected 
from the body. This acute pleasure therefore coincides with a loss, a 
separation from the body, and the isolating of objects outside it. (Kristeva, 
1974, p. 151) 
For Kristeva (1974), the body is not unified and would be torn to pieces by the drives 
but for its nature as a process - a process whereby its plurality is integrated within 
sign systems. Negatit1ity is "both the cause and the organizing principle of the 
process" (p. 109). Named both rejection and abjection (Weir, 1996, p. 100), it is " the 
movement found in the separation of matter .... that produces the theses [of 
signification)" (Kristeva, 1974, pp 107 -110). 
The anal drive's rejection and expulsion enact a pattern of 'separation'- a pattern that 
is repeated in the abjection of the maternal body and acquisition of language in the 
mirror stage. Another pattern exists here in relation to ' identification'. Kristeva terms 
the dyadism of the child's relation to its mother prior to the mirror stage the 
narcissistic structure. Within this structure the infant identifies with the mother's 
breast, creating the pattern for all subsequent identifications. This pattern of 
identification is repeated in the oral drive's pleasure in incorporation (Oliver, 1993b). 
For Kristeva, the infant's identification with the 'pattern' of the breast is a 
'reduplication' of a pattern that generates all object relations: 
the logic of reduplication, put in motion by the first identifications with 
the mother's body - sets up the logic of the psyche: repetition. The logic of 
reduplication itself becomes a pattern reduplicated by the psyche. (p. 72} 
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This pattern emerges again in the o~illation between the semiotic and the symbolic in 
language. The semiotic, as a discharge of the drives, both disrupts and generates the 
unity of the symbolic. Just as this unity is present prior to the mirror stage, in the 
pleasure of incorporation and identification, semiotic negativity is also a generative 
element within language. The tlretic break is Kristeva's term for the point at which the 
separations within the semiotic reach a threshold. This threshold generates a larger 
break in the form of the mirror stage and the subsequent entry into language. Thus, 
what Kelly Oliver (1993a) terms a dialectical oscillation 
found already within the material body, leads from one level to another 
and eventually gives rise to the speaking subject. This is not a static 
oscillation. Rather it is a productive oscillation that crosses ever-new 
thresholds because of the dynamic tension between rejection and stases, 
semiotic and symbolic. (p. 2) 
After the mirror stage, rejection transforms into desire. The subject after the mirror 
stage is the subject of signification, is separate, and always in relation to an 'other' in 
order to stabilize its identity. For Kristeva, the pattern of separation and unification 
into subject and object is endless (Oiiver, 1993a). The subject is always in crisis, the 
abject constantly invoked, and attempts at unity and separation are endlessly undone. 
Kristeva (1982) calls abjection a precondition of narr · sism, of the self/other relation, 
that fails in its attempt at "self-sufficient haven" (p. 14). She thus designates abjection 
a 'narcissistic crisis' expressed when the separating and repeating 'economy' of the 
semiotic is repeated in the symbolic. Abjection is revealed in all that is not contained 
within a sign system: 
What having been the mother, will turn into the abject. Repelling, 
rejecting; repelling itself, rejecting itself, Ab-jecting. In this struggle, 
which fashions the human being, the mimesis, by means of which he 
becomes homologous to another in order to become himself, is in short 
logically and chronologically secondary. Even before being like, "I" am 
not but do separate, reject, ab-ject. (p. 12) 
Abjection, as "the demarcation imperative" (p. 68) is both a recognition of the desire 
for transcendence of the body- and its impossibility. Abjection is a recognition of the 
"impure, defiling elements of...uncontrollable materiality" (Gross, 1990, p. 88) that 
continually threaten and are never eliminated. Just as taboos and rituals attempt to 
contain the abject 'in-between' of the body's spit, faeces, and menstruation, cultural 
practices and rituals such as religion, literature, philosophy, art, and analysis, exist to 
defend against the constant return of the abject. Catharsis, purification, sublimation 
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and repression are all utilized by the psyche in relation to abjection. For Kristeva, 
religion displaces, socialization practices repress, and literature, poetry and art serve 
to sublimate abjection (Grosz, 1986). Similarly, within language, the abject maternal 
body is replaced by the seeming unity of the sign. In this respect, A. I. and a-life could 
also be considered as ongoing cultural rituals of repression and purification of the 
defiling, uncontrollable materiality of the body. 
AN ABJECT TECHNOLOGY 
There are three modalities by which A.l. and a-life can be considered as cultural 
instantiations of abjection. The thetic pattern of separation and identification can be 
witnessed in the sciences of A.l. and a-life within: the sacrifice of the maternal, the 
phobic attempt to place body and mind entirely within a sign system, and in the 
attempt to stabilize identity via the creation of a technological other. 
A.l. and a-life can be seen as reduplications of the sacrifice of the maternal initiated in 
pre-Oedipal processes and then repeated within the thetic. In the thetic, the subject's 
unity in the symbolic is gained via the sacrifice of the semiotic maternal, with identity 
secured by the exchange of the maternal abject for the 'objects' of language (Reineke, 
1997): 
Kristeva signals that reason, logic, grammar, syntax, univocal meanings-
the so called 'higher' achievements of civilization- function only because 
of a sometimes violent repression and sacrifice. (Grosz, 1989, p. 49) 
A tlwtic crisis occurs when the pre-Oedipal separations between mother and child are 
called into question by boundary failures. For the child, those initial separations 
comprised a terrifying conflict for identity where "the stakes (were) 'me or mommy"' 
(Reineke, 1997, p. 27). A revisiting of that conflict, within a thetic crisis, witnesses the 
abject maternal again threatening obliteration of identity. For Kristeva, thetic crises 
also occur culturally, prompting larger cultural rituals of abjection. In the case of the 
cultural ritual of sacrifice, the thetic is reduplicated, but instead of murdering the 
maternal, the conflict is resolved by the actual murder of the body (Oiiver, 1993b) -
"killing substance to make it signify" (Kristeva, 1974, p. 41). 
Similarly, A.I. and a-life can be understood as cultural rituals of abjection that 
reduplicate the thetic sacrifice of the maternal body. A.l. and a-life attempt to replace 
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the reproductive powers of the maternal and the monstrousness of her subsequent 
authority over existence. This rejection of the maternal is then reduplicated in A. I. and 
a-life via sacrifice of the impure materiality of the body, in an attempt at an entirely 
symbolic, and therefore stable, technological identity. Kristeva asserts that these 
rituals function to conceal the murder of the semiotic mother, keep her threat at bay, 
and prevent us from hav ing to commit actual matricide (Reineke, 1997). They are 
"body-bounding practices ... (that] also bind the social order" (p. %). Within cultural 
rituals: 
society may be read as [the] generalized text of an ongoing battle with 
abjection ... (where negativity) is placed under control of the sign and the 
institutions that support it. (p. 91) 
A reduplication of the patterns of separation and identification within language is 
evidenced in the classification practices of A.l. and a-life. These sciences can be 
understood as attempts to contain the abject semiotic body within language: 
a technocratic, state-dominated social milieu can severely contain the 
semiotic both in the sense of a severe and overly strict father, and in the 
sense of placing everything within a representation. (Lechte, 1990, p. 157) 
For Kristeva, there is a phobic fear of the unnamed: "fear is the mark of the failure of 
language to provide a symbolization to contain drive activity" (Lcchte, 1990, p. 161). 
The unnamed, as that which has not been defined or separated into an object of 
language, is an abject ' non-object' that indicates an insufficient separation from the 
maternal (Lechte, 1990). Labelling signals a desire for a regulated, rationalized, 
unified r:-ality (Moi, 1985). A.l. and a-life's constant labelling and classification of the 
materiality and processes of the body and mind serve a phobic desire for purification 
via the regulation and rationalization of the abject semiotic. 
For Kristeva, identity formed through the mirror phase relies on a cohesive image of 
self inside a body: "it is a subject, an ego, only with reference to the mapping and 
signification of its corporeality" (Gross, 1990, p. 85). The body is the abject reminder 
of origins and mortality and "the disavowed condition of consciousness" (Grosz, 
1989, p. 74). The ego 
recoils from the idea of being tied to or limited by the body's 
form .... Abjection is a sickness afone's own body, at the body beyond that 
'clean and proper' thing, the body of the subject. (p. 77) 
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This mapping of the body's corporeality within the mirror phase is extended 
culturally in A.I. and a-life's attempt to classify and formalise the hidden unknowns 
of identity and life. However, computer technology provides the means by which this 
classification and mapping exceeds the creation of knowledge. Within the digital 
paradigm, formalisation allows replication, which, within 'strong' claims, means the 
duplication of a bounded, autonomous, identity - a stable identity ablt> to transcend 
. the abject of the body. 
While unsuccessful, A.l. and a-life's attempt to duplicate identity can be understood 
as a cultural instance of abjection. Nichols (1988) argues that artificial intelligence 
systems have replaced the mother as our imaginary other. However, it can be argued 
that this artificial other, as image of both self and other, is 11eiflrcr, and therefore an 
unstable abject: 
human identity remains at stake, subject to change, vulnerable to 
challenge and modification as the very metaphors prompted by the 
imaginary Others that give it form themselves change ... What had been 
fixed comes unhinged. (p. 28) 
A.l. and a-life models transpire as copies that threaten the 'original' of identity. 
However, while this autonomous, technological identity exists only in the 
imagination, the reverse is also asserted, as identity is always in excess of the 
proposed models of A.l. and a-life "something is always left over, 'a remnant 
experienced as the body"' (Reineke, 1997, p. 53). The A.I./a-life identity remains 
abject, caught between subject and object, never an autonomous other. 
If achieved, the creatures of strong A.l. and a-life would perhaps be considered 
instances of the sublime and uncannyl. For Jervis (1998), technology that appears 
autonomous is often associated with the feelings of helplessness and awe attributed to 
the sublime. However, as Sofoulis (1988) asserts, the sublime, as "that which is not yet 
realized" (p. 12), once realized, is no longer sublime and gives way to the uncanny "as 
soon as it is realized ... the sublime loses its transcendent 'purity'. As the word is made 
2 While not irrelevant, a detailed analysis of the links between abjection and the concepts of the 
sublime and uncanny when applied to A.l. and a-life, is beyond the scope of this study. Future 
research could provide elucidation in this regard, particularly in relation to Kristeva's 
remotivation of Freud's concepts of negativity and the death drive, in relation to these 
concepts. 
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flesh, it becomes corrupted" (p. 12). Freud's notion of the uncanny is often associated 
with automata. However, for Freud, feelings of uncanniness arise from familiarity 
with that which has been previously repressed- accordingly, uncan~i.ness, in relation 
to A.l., is ultimately a confusion of the double and the self, relating to the pre-Oedipal 
Jack of separation into subject and object. For Freud (1955), the double's promise of 
immortality is reversed, and it becomes "the uncanny harbinger of death" (p. 235). A 
purely symbolic, and therefore stable identity remains an illusion, ultimately 
overwhelmed by what it denies - the original Jack of identity in the pre-Oedipal 
semiotic: 
For a whil~. a double can freeze the instability of the same, give it 
temporary identity, but eventually it explores the abyss of the same, 
probing those unsuspected and unplumable depths. The double is the 
unconscious depth of the same, that which threatens it, can engulf it. 
(Weir, 1996, p. 179). 
The abject Jack of separation between mother and child precedes identity, initiates the 
conditions of its existence, and repeatedly negates it. The doubles of A.l. and a-life are 
a cultural manifestation of the continual processes of separation into subject and 
object within identity. There is, in each instance of this pattern, an abject remainder, a 
defiling non-object, that prompts the next iteration of identification and separation. 
A.l. and a-life, as reduplicated patterns of abjection, are but "the 'negative 
hallucination' of an unachieved identification" (Weir, 1996, p. 180). 
CONCLUSION 
Julia Kristeva's notion of abjection is demonstrated as a pattern that exceeds its pre-
Oedipal origins - the separations and identifications of the maternal body are 
repeated within the oral and anal drives, within the thetic break, in the semiotic and 
symbolic elements comprising language, and in larger cultural rituals of abjection. 
The thetic sacrifice of the maternal, phobic containment of the semiotic body within 
language, and use of an 'other' to stabilize identity, are all reduplicated within the 
cultural practice of A.I. and a-life via sacrifice, classification, and duplication, of the 
abject materiality of the body and life. 
If achieved, the technological 'other' of A.l. and a-life may be considered an instance 
of the sublime or uncanny. However, as objects of a scientific imagination constructed 
to "destabilize and "eimagine (its) methods and objects of knowledge" (Haraway, 1989, 
p. 324), the duplication of identity within successive A.l. and a-life models remains a 
34 
repeated attempt to categorize the unknown, abject remainder of the body and life. 
This imagined duplication of identity remains an abject process of identity - A.l. and a-
life are revealed as cultural reduplications of abjection. 
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CHAPTER4 
0 = 2, THE MIRROR & THE KNIFE 
INTRODUCfiON 
The project 0 = 2 is a photographic construction of an A.l./a-life identity, neither robot 
nor android, but a bodiless self in the network behind the lens, the screen, and the 
code. The communication of this artificial persona is imagined as an endless narrative, 
fragmented and dispersed throughout the images, sounds and words of the network, 
unseen and unknown in its entirety. The network is not a technological web with 
images of satellite and surveillance, but refers to the larger complexity of the 
representations of science and of culture. This project is envisaged as a selection of 
frac;ments from this larger narrative, whereby the persona, a relative 'ghost in the 
machine', utilizes the textual code of its construction and the photographic 
technologies of . identity, to communicate, unheard, the loss and desires of its 
existence. 
THE MIRROR & THE KNIFE 3 
0 = 2 represents A.l. and a-life's classification of intelligence and life within images of 
a 'fantastic voyage' into the hidden unknown of the body and of nature - a voyage 
that ultimately reveals only the unconscious screens and masks of our cultural 
identifications and abjections. The technologies of photography have long been 
implicated in the 'biological gaze' of science, whereby even the highest resolution 
images construct and create as they examine (Keller, 1996). Within this project, 
cultural images are both found inside, and projected upon, the microscopic detail of 
our vision. 
This confounding of the anatomic real and the culturally constructed is also 
represented within these photographs through a confusion of the categories ' natural' 
and 'artificial'. What appears natural has often been digitally constructed, while the 
' natural' body, photographed or printed atypically, appears blatantly artificial. 
Similarly, a certain artificiality emerges within photographs of genitalia -as the not-
3 Sawday's (1995) treatise on Renaissance anatomy reports these tools as the attributes of 
Auatomia, the goddess of division. 
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represented, the hidden and threatening, of the over-photographed and investigated 
body. 
This project also attempts to mirror the teno;ions of A.l. and a-life, the "flow of 
· opposites into each other" (Lechte, 1990, p. 117) of these technologies of abjection. 
Television stills were photographed using a rule-based cut-up technique intended to 
creatively underline and plunder differences between formal and unconscious 
processes. 'Cut up' is a technique, pioneered by William Burroughs, involving the 
physical cutting up and rearranging of texts in order to elicit unforseen meanings 
(Skerl, 2004). In this case, 'cutting-up' refers to the splicing of the screen by the 
shutter-click of a camera, with images removed from their contextual meaning within 
television programs and rearranged into a photographic narrative. Similarly, unusual 
effects were created in some images from a complicated mixing of digital and analog 
technologies. For example, in a series of photographs, an x-ray was used as the basis 
for a photogram, the photogram was then used in place of the negative for a 
photographic print, and finally, this print was digitally scanned, manipulated, 
separated into multiple images, and printed. 
Similarly, the content of particular photographs refers to tensions of the self/other 
relation as a dynamic of abjection of the maternal "the abject appears in order to 
uphold "I" within the Other. The abject is the violence of mourning for an "object" 
that has always already been lost" (Kristeva, 1982, p. 241). 
A.l and a-life's attempt to transcend the abject materiality of the body and life is 
countered within this project by a restating of the maternal within these sciences. 
Whereas A.l. and a-life abject the maternal and the body in an attempt to stabilize 
identity, Kristeva argues that art 'reinvests' the denied maternal, thereby both 
constructing and destroying symbolic identity (Grosz, 1989) "if art represents a crisis, 
it is above all a resurrecti<'n. The crisis exists only for mirrors that are enamoured of 
stable images" (Kristeva, 1997, p. 171). The attempt in A.l. and a-life to place the abject 
materiality of the body and life entirely within a sign system, is countered by the 
maternal's "permanent calling into question" (Caputi, 1993, p. 5) of identity. 
Accordingly, images of the maternal breast, as the originating object of patterns of 
identification and separation, are inserted into the scientific diagrams of A.l. and a-
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life. Within these photographs, the ' discrete state' of the Turing Maclli11e is revealed as 
the infinite-state of the maternal relation. 
These patterns of abjection are extended to the photographic via both pixellation and 
repetition of the body. Similarly, the metaphoric use of a shutter-release-cable as 
umbilical cord represents the abject non-separati"n of subject and object in that 
pattern. Other images depict the vulnerability of the body as a disorderly container 
for identity, an identity continually disrupted by the separations and identifications of 
the drives. 
The notion of abjection, as unresolvable binary process, is confirmed by Lechte (1990) 
as a " logic of ambivalence" (p. 109) antithetical to the logic of science. He reasons that 
the logic of abjection is not the 'true or false' (0 or 1) of the scientific and digital 
worlds, but ' true n11d false' (0 and 2)- the infinite and uroboric processes of the mirror 
and the knife. For Sofoulis (1983), the uroborus, the symbol of a snake circling to eat its 
own tail, relates to pre-Oedipal non-separation, while for Kelly (1995), it has long 
been associated with feedback and the 'repeat loops' of computer code. As a 
photographic representation of the endless separations and identifications of identity, 
0 = 2 attempts to amplify the uroboric reduplication of abjection in the technologies of 
A. I. and a-life. 
CONCLUSION 
0 = 2 is a narrative of identity as an open system in infinite crisis and process. The 
messy, unruly materiality of the body exceeds the clean and proper body of the 
symbolic. A.I. and a-life's fantasy of finitude is disconfirmed by the infinite context of 
the unquantifiable, abject materiality of the body an, I life. 0 = 2 confirms " the only 
way to tell the story of these tense contradictions is to c: eate/perform these ruptures 
as well" (Harrington, 1998, p. 1). 
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CONCLUSION 
Through an elaboration of the psychoanalytic concept of the abject, this research 
investigated the nature of A.l. and a-life in relation to identity. A photographic 
response to these investigations led to the creation of 0 • 2 - a photographic 
representation of a n A.l./a-life identity. To achieve this aim, the creative project and 
its exegesis: identified and reviewed cybercultural analyses of the constructions of 
identity within computer technologies; identified and reviewed the paradigms and 
concepts of the sciences of A.l. and a-life; and elaborated Julia Kristeva's 
psychoanalytic concept of abjection in order to demonstrate an occurrence of the 
abject within A.l. and a-life. This research reveals A.l. and a-life as cultural 
reduplications of abjection. 
Technological creations such as A.l. and a-life involve cultural understandings of the 
body, mind, and identity. A.l. is critiqued for a privileging of the mind over the body, 
with a-life's promise of a fluid and decentred identity revealed as both mystical and 
reductionist. A. I. and a-life entail unconscious desires and impulses to control, replace 
and transcend the monstrousness of the maternal body by its phobic placement 
within sign systems. Classification and formalisation of intelligence and life would 
enable the computer technology of A.l. and a-life to replicate identity. However, 
intelligence, life, and consciousness are situated and embodied, and therefore elude 
complete classification within the successive models of A.l. and a-life research. 
Creation of an imagined duplicate 'other' to stabilize identity remains unachieved, as 
there is always an abject remainder to the unquantifiable and unknown materiality of 
the body. An elaboration of abjection reveals the pre-Oedipal separations and 
identifications of the maternal body reduplicated in the cultural rituals of A.l. and a-
life. As a consequence, the technologies of A. I. and a-life reveal an identity in constant 
crisis and process. 
While an identity stabilized by successful duplication would perhaps be an instance 
of the sublime and uncanny, it was beyond the scope of this research to provide an in-
depth analysis of these concepts in relation to abjection. However, this project 
suggests future avenues of creative exploration in this regard - particularly in respect 
to an extension of the photographic creation of a technological 'other' within this 
project, by the future creation of a photographic avatar - an electronic photographic 
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performance of an autonomous identity. Creative exploration suggested by this 
project also includes the use of both microphotography and astroplwtography as 
technologies relevant to the creation of this avatar. Theoretically, a further 
investigation of the abject is suggested in relation to the sublime and uncanny in the 
technological 'other' . Specifically, Kristeva's remotivation of Freud's concept of 
negation, as an expression of the death drive within abjection, could be explored in 
relation to concepts of the double and repetition, encapsulated by the abject figure of 
the ur<'borus4. 
This project's significance is its unique contribution to both photography and theory 
as a demonstration of the scientific concepts of A.l. and a-life as reduplications of 
abjection. 0 = 2 is a photographic work elaborating the occurrence of abjection within 
these technologies: 
As I lay bare, under the cunning, orderly surface of civilizations, the 
nurturing horror that they attend to pushing aside by purifying, 
systematizing, and thinking; the horror that they seize on in order to build 
therr.selves up and function? I rather conceive it as a work of 
disappointment, of frustration, and hollowing - probably the only 
counterweight to abjection. (Kristeva, 1982, p. 210) 
4 This concept owes a debt to Zoe Sofoulis' (1988) l11e Fraukeusteiuitm Sublime in which she 
synchronistically identifies a link between Kristeva's theory _and the uroborus. 
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